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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) is a phrase that many people 
have never heard. This phrase, however, represents one of the most 
important calculations in environmental and energy regulation. The 
SCC is defined by the Environmental Protection Agency as “an 
estimate of the economic damages associated with a small increase in 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, conventionally one metric ton, in a 
given year.”1 The SCC allows climate change policymakers to 
calculate the benefit in regard to the reduction of CO2 emissions.2 The 
calculation of the SCC has allowed federal agencies to conduct a 
proper cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of environmental regulatory 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. I would like to thank Professor Hal Morris, our Executive Editors 
Emily Linehan and Stephen Pigozzi, and peer editor David E. Braden for all of their 
help in writing this article. 
1 John Wihbey, Understanding the Social Cost of Carbon—and Connecting It 
to Our Lives, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (Feb. 12, 2015), 
http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2015/02/understanding-the-social-cost-of-
carbon-and-connecting-it-to-our-lives/. 
2 Jason S. Johnston, The Social Cost of Carbon, REG., Spring 2016, at 36, 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2016/4/regulation-
v39n1-4.pdf. 
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actions.3 The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for 
imposing mandatory energy conservation standards to decrease energy 
consumption and decrease CO2 emissions.4 A central policy of the 
DOE is to ensure national safety by addressing its “energy, 
environmental and nuclear challenges through transformative science 
and technology solutions.”5  
The DOE is responsible for imposing mandatory energy 
conservation standards.6 In doing so, the agency must review these 
standards and, when necessary, implement new standards.7 The 
implementation of new standards requires the DOE to abide by certain 
statutory requirements.8 One statutory requirement mandates that the 
agency to ensure the standards are technologically feasible and 
economically justified.9 This economic justification requirement tasks 
the DOE with conducting a cost-benefit analysis.10 
In Zero Zone, Inc. v. United States Department of Energy (Zero 
Zone), the Seventh Circuit addressed a case involving a CBA 
performed by the DOE, in which the agency used the SCC as a factor 
in its analysis.11 The DOE implemented new regulations, known as 
The New Standards Rule which reduced the standard of energy 
allowance for commercial refrigeration equipment (CRE).12 The DOE 
performed a cost-benefit analysis to ensure the New Standards Rule 
satisfied the statutory framework by being economically justified.13 
Policies are considered to be economically justified when the benefits 
                                                 
3 Id. 
4 Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2016). 
5 Mission, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/mission (last visited Nov. 20, 
2016). 
6 Zero Zone, Inc., 832 F.3d at 662. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id.  
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 664. 
13 Id. at 666. 
2
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of the standard exceed its burdens.14 While the benefit of the standard 
may exceed the burden, the burden can still result in a staggering 
figure that will fall on the shoulders of manufacturers.15 However, on 
the opposite end of the spectrum, the benefit can outweigh the cost by 
providing a net benefit to consumers; which was precisely what the 
New Standards Rule accomplished by providing a benefit between 
$4.93 and $11.74 billion.16 The DOE must balance the costs and the 
benefits to ensure the burden is not too great for manufacturers, which 
will likely then be transferred onto consumers.  
However, the benefit may exceed the burden even though some 
manufacturers may be unable to bear the costs.17 In Zero Zone, Zero 
Zone, Inc., Heating Refrigeration Institute, and North American 
Association of Food Equipment Manufacturers (collectively, 
Petitioners) challenged the regulations imposed by the DOE, as well as 
the inclusion of the SCC when conducting a cost-benefit analysis.18 
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the DOE and upheld the use of the 
SCC to project the harms caused by carbon dioxide emissions.19  
 Part I of this article provides an overview of the SCC. Part II 
provides an overview of relevant statutes and case law that provides a 
foundation for agencies to consider the SCC. Part III examines the 
facts of Zero Zone and the court’s reasoning in upholding the use of 
SCC. Finally, Part IV will explain why the Seventh Circuit’s use of the 
SCC in a regulatory cost-benefit analysis was appropriate.  
 
                                                 
14 42 U.S.C.A. § 6295(o)(2)(B) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244). 
15 See Zero Zone, Inc., 832 F.3d at 666 (“DOE then determined that the 
development of new CRE would cost manufacturers between $93.9 and $165 
million”). 
16 Id. at 666. 
17 Id. at 683. The DOE concluded that “small businesses will likely have 
greater increases in component costs than large businesses, and may have greater 
difficulty obtaining credit.” Id. 
18 Id. at 667. 
19 Id. at 660. 
3
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THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 
  
The SCC has become one of the most important potential factors 
in an environmental cost-benefit analysis. The SCC has the ability to 
tip the scales in favor of a standard or regulation being considered 
beneficial as opposed to burdensome. For example, in 2006 the 
Environmental Protection Agency estimated the industry cost of its 
greenhouse gas tailpipe regulation for light-duty gasoline-powered 
cars and trucks to be around $350 billion.20 The agency concluded that 
the regulation would result in a $280 billion public benefit.21 At this 
point the burden outweighed the benefit, which rendered the regulation 
as economically unjustified. However, the Environmental Protection 
Agency then added the SCC as a potential benefit that can be 
quantified.22 The regulation’s net cost of $70 billion was suddenly 
extinguished, and the regulation resulted in a net public benefit of 
$100 billion.23 Thus, the SCC has the potential to make a major impact 
when evaluating the effectiveness of environmental and energy 
regulations. The following section analyzes the development of the 
SCC and how it is calculated. 
 
A. The Ninth Circuit Requires Administrative Agency to Consider 
CO2 Emissions 
 
 In 2008, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a petition by eleven states, 
District of Columbia, the City of New York, and four public interest 
organizations that challenged a rule issued by the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration.24 The rule set corporate average fuel 
economy standards for light trucks, minivans, and pickup trucks.25 The 
                                                 
20 Johnston, supra note 2, at 36. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23
 Id. 
24 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
25 Id. 
4
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petitioners argued the rule was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act because: 
(a) the agency’s cost-benefit analysis does not set the 
[corporate average fuel economy] standard at the 
maximum feasible level and fails to give consideration to 
the need of the nation to conserve energy; [and] (b) its 
calculation of the costs and benefits of alternative fuel 
economy standards assigns zero value to the benefit of 
CO2 emissions reduction.26 
 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration argued that there 
is an “extremely wide variation in published estimates of damage costs 
from greenhouse gas emissions, costs for controlling or avoiding their 
emissions, and costs of sequestering emissions that do occur, the three 
major sources for developing estimates of economic benefits from 
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.”27 In other words, the parties 
disagreed on whether calculating the cost of reducing CO2 emissions 
was necessary and reliable. 
 The Ninth Circuit held that the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration’s reasoning was arbitrary and capricious.28 The Court 
conceded that the value of carbon emissions reduction may be difficult 
to ascertain because the value may have a wide range of values.29 
However, the Court concluded that the value of carbon emissions 
reduction is “certainly not zero.”30 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the 
petitioners that the scientifically supported values of carbon emission 
reduction demonstrated that it is possible to monetize the benefit of 
reducing carbon emission.31 The Ninth Circuit determined that the cost 
of carbon emissions reduction can, and should, be calculated.  
                                                 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1192. 
28 Id. at 1199. 
29
 Id. at 1200. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. The court noted that the range of values does not begin at $0 so there 
must be some calculable value. Id. 
5
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B. 2010 Technical Support Document 
 
The Obama administration established the SCC.32 The 
administration published the Technical Support Document (“Support 
Document”) which provides an overview of the SCC.33 The Support 
Document states that the purpose of the SCC is to “allow agencies to 
incorporate the social benefits of reducing [CO2] emissions into a 
cost-benefit analysis of regulatory actions that have small, or marginal, 
impacts on cumulative global emissions.”34 However, the Support 
Document concedes that uncertainties and model differences result in 
a range of SCC estimates.35  
The Support Document defines the SCC as “an estimate of the 
monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in carbon 
emissions in a given year.”36 The SCC is intended to account for the 
changes in net agriculture productivity, human health, property 
damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem 
services due to climate change.37 However, the SCC is still considered 
to be provisional.38 The Support Document includes recognition that a 
number of key uncertainties remain regarding the current SCC 
estimates; however, these estimates are predicted to evolve with 
improved understanding of the scientific and economic factors 
involved in determining the SCC.39 The United States government 
                                                 
32 Cass R. Sunstein, A Court Ruling That Could Save the Planet, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-08-12/a-court-
ruling-that-could-save-the-planet. 
33 Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost of Carbon, U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL 
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 1 (August 2016), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
12/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf. [hereinafter 2010 Support Document]. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 2. 
38 Id. at 4.  
39 Id. 
6
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must periodically review and reconsider estimates of the SCC used for 
cost-benefit analyses to ensure the SCC value is accurate based on 
scientific development.40 
 There are three integrated assessment models (IAMs) used to 
estimate the SCC,41 which combine “climate processes, economic 
growth, and feedbacks between the climate and the global economy 
into a single modeling framework.”42 Some may view use of global 
factors in determining the SCC as controversial. However, any 
international concerns are moot because the SCC does not give 
extraterritorial effect to a federal law and “hence does not intrude on 
such interests,” meaning the SCC does not impose any costs or 
regulations on foreign sovereigns.43 Additionally, the SCC considers 
many other additional factors such as: the valuing of non-CO2 
emissions, equilibrium climate sensitivity, socio-economic and 
emissions trajectories, and discount rates.44 
 
C. Calculating the SCC 
 
 IAMs are used to establish the SCC estimates that are used in rule 
making.45 The three models that are used to compute the SCC were 
academically developed and are widely used in estimating future 
climate harms.46 These models allow a user to enter a set of economic 
                                                 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 5. The three models used to formulate the SCC are: DICE (Dynamic 
Model of Integrated Climate and the Economy), PAGE (Policy Analysis of the 
Greenhouse Effect), and FUND (Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, 
and Distribution). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 10 (referencing to the fact that the United States cannot enact federal 
statutes that have an extraterritorial effect to ensure that U.S. laws respect the 
interests of foreign sovereigns). 
44
 See id. at 13–23.  
45 Johnston, supra note 2, at 36. 
46 Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 99 CAL, L. REV. 1557, 1577 (2011).  
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parameters47 which includes projections about future greenhouse gas 
emissions.48 The models use the projected emissions to predict 
changes in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.49 
The changes in greenhouse gases are used to predict changes in the 
temperature, which in turn allow the models to project economic 
harms from the expected temperature increases.50  
 The Interagency Work Group (IWG), which was formed to create 
the SCC51, ran these three models and used standard baseline 
projections of economic growth and technological development to 
determine the predicted effects that warming has on the nation’s gross 
domestic product.52 The IWG obtained the mean outcome for each 
model and averaged the three results together which resulted in the 
baseline average reduction in gross domestic product.53 The IWG re-
ran the models, but did so with one additional ton of carbon emissions 
to determine the marginal effect on global gross domestic product of 
the additional unit of carbon.54 The result of the equation was then 
subtracted from the baseline which resulted in the SCC.55 For an 
agency to calculate the benefits of carbon reduction in federal 
regulations, it would multiply the emissions avoided by the price of a 
ton of emissions for the appropriate year.56  
  
                                                 
47 Id. at 1578. The economic parameters include preexisting baseline 
projections of economic grown and technological improvement. Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 2010 Support Document, supra note 33, at 2. 
52 Masur, supra note 47, at 1578. 
53 Id. 
54
 Id. 
55 Id. at 1579 (“[T]he social cost of carbon: the amount of money saved for 
every marginal ton of carbon that is not emitted.”). 
56 Id. 
8
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BACKGROUND 
 
 The creation of the SCC arose from the need to calculate the cost 
of CO2 reduction to have a proper CBA.57 However, agencies cannot 
simply create the SCC and apply without statutory authority.   
 
A.  Administrative Procedure Act 
 
A court must look to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
when deciding relevant questions of law and determining the meaning 
or applicability of the terms of an agency action.58 The reviewing court 
must hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, findings, and 
conclusions that are found to be (a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (b) contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (c) in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right; (d) without observance of procedure required by law; and        
(e) unsupported by substantial evidence.59 Courts determine whether 
an agency’s decision is arbitrary or capricious by inquiring whether the 
agency “has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that is counter to the 
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”60 
Agencies must follow the APA when implementing new regulations. 
 
B.  Chevron Doctrine 
 
“The power of an administrative agency to administer a 
congressionally created…program necessarily requires the 
                                                 
57 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
58 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-224). 
59 Id. 
60 Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 668 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, 
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”61 
 
 Congress cannot account for every possible gap in the formulation 
of a policy or the making of a rule. Congress may explicitly delegate 
for an agency to clarify or fill any provisional gaps.62 Congress may 
also implicitly delegate authority to an agency.63 The Chevron 
Doctrine, announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., refers to a defense by a governmental agency which allows the 
court to show deference to the agency’s interpretation of a law it 
administers.64 The court must perform a two-part test when reviewing 
an agency’s construction of a statute.65 The first step is to determine 
whether Congress has spoken directly regarding the precise question at 
issue.66 The court and agency must adhere to the express intent of 
Congress if the intent is unambiguous and clear.67 However, if a court 
determines that Congress did not directly address the precise question 
at issue, the court will then examine whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.68 The court should 
not impose its own construction on the statute if an agency has already 
done so.69 An agency’s regulations are given controlling weight unless 
the regulations are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.70 Courts have generally held that there should be considerable 
                                                 
61 Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). 
62 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984). 
63 Id. at 844. 
64 Id. at 842. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 842–43. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 843. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 844. 
10
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weight attributed to an executive department’s construction of a 
statutory scheme.71  
 
C.  EPCA and Regulating CRE’s 
 
Congress has been active in pursuing the protection of the 
environment. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) 
authorizes the DOE to impose mandatory energy conservation 
standards.72 The EPCA creates certain parameters that the DOE must 
abide by to properly establish energy conservation standards that will 
satisfy statutory requirements.73 One primary purpose of the EPCA is 
to improve the energy efficiency of equipment and appliances.74 The 
EPCA directs the DOE to review energy conservation standards and to 
implement new ones when it is appropriate.75 
Congress has established a framework that the DOE must follow 
when establishing new energy conservation standards.76 First, the 
DOE may not impose standards that increase the maximum allowable 
energy use of any individual unit.77 Second, the standards must be 
designed to achieve the “maximum improvement in energy 
efficiency”, and the standards must be “technologically feasible and 
economically justified.”78 The EPCA also requires that the DOE 
establish testing procedures that will measure the energy use of any 
covered equipment.79 The result of these measures will require the 
DOE to conduct a cost-benefit analysis that will measure the burden 
placed on manufacturers versus the benefit gained by the public by 
                                                 
71 Id.  
72 42 U.S.C.A. § 6295(a) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2016) 
77 42 U.S.C.A. § 6295(o)(1). 
78 Id. § 6295(o)(2). 
79 Zero Zone, Inc., 832 F.3d at 663. 
11
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reducing carbon. Congress amended the EPCA in 2005 to specifically 
include CRE’s in the industrial equipment category.80  
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 created standards for different 
classes of CRE.81 The act also called for the DOE to set standards for 
any additional classes of CRE that the EPCA did not address.82 Thus, 
congress gave the DOE clear instructions to prescribe standards 
regarding CRE. In 2009, the DOE added 39 more CRE classes that 
were defined by a combination of the equipment’s geometry, door 
type, condensing-unit configuration, and its operating temperature.83 
Congress further amended CRE requirement under the American 
Energy Manufacturing Technical Corrections Act. The act 
implemented specific standards for self-contained commercial 
refrigerators with transparent doors.84 The DOE must set standards for 
CRE that Congress does not explicitly set a standard for, and that 
require regulation to conserve energy. 
 
D.  Executive Order 12866 
 
Executive order 12866 was issued by President Clinton in 1993.85 
The order requires agencies to design regulations in the most cost-
effective manner to achieve the regulatory objective.86 In doing so, 
each agency must access both the costs and the benefits of the 
intended regulation.87 The order recognizes that some of these costs 
and benefits may be difficult to quantify.88 Each agency should 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 663–64. 
85 Summary of Executive Order 12866, ENV. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-executive-order-12866-regulatory-
planning-and-review (last visited Dec. 1, 2016). 
86 Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed.Reg. 51,735 (1993). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
12
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propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that 
the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.89 
 
E.  Colorado District Court Requires Agency to Use SCC 
 
 In July 2013, environmental organizations sought judicial review 
of three agency decisions by the Bureau of Land Management that, 
when taken together, authorized on-the-ground mining exploration 
activities in a part of the North Fork Valley, located in western 
Colorado.90 Plaintiffs alleged that the agency decisions failed to 
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the 
APA.91 The agency provided “an adequate disclosure of effects on 
adjacent lands.”92 However, the issue stemmed from the agency’s 
treatment of the costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions, 
which the court held to be arbitrary and capricious.93 The agency 
failed to evaluate all of the effects of a proposed action which includes 
analyzing direct, indirect, and cumulative effects as is required to be 
done under NEPA.94  
 The agency quantified the amount of emissions relative to state 
and national emissions; however the agency failed to quantify the 
impacts on global climate change.95 Instead, the agency simply 
provided an explanation as to why the analysis would be impossible.96 
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado rejected 
the argument because such a tool was available.97 The SCC was 
designed to quantify a project’s contribution to costs associated with 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 
1174, 1181 (D. Colo. 2014). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1189. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1190. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
13
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global climate change.98 The court provided further support for the 
validity of the SCC by referencing the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s support and use of it.99 Plaintiff’s petition for review of the 
agency action was granted and sustained, and the court immediately 
enjoined the defendants from proceeding in any manner that included 
construction.100 The court reasoned that the environmental impact 
statement contained a factually inaccurate justification by omitting the 
SCC.101 However, the court noted that agencies do not always have to 
use the SCC as they may have a justifiable reason for not doing so.102 
  
F.  D.C. Circuit Upholds Agency’s Decision to Ignore SCC 
 
 Several environmental organizations petitioned to the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia for review of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) “conditional authorization of the 
Cove Point liquefied natural gas facility from an import maritime 
terminal to a mixed-use, import and export terminal.”103 Petitioners 
argued that FERC failed to consider several possible environmental 
impacts that the Cove Point conversation project may have.104 In 
particular, petitioners challenged FERC’s failure to use an SCC 
analysis or a similar analytical tool to analyze the environmental 
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from the construction, operation, 
and conversation of the Cove Point facilities.105 The court denied the 
petitioners relief and held that FERC was not required to consider 
climate impacts under NEPA.  
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1201. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1193. 
103
 EarthReports, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 828 F.3d 949, 951 
(D.C. Cir. 2016). 
104 Id. at 951–52. 
105 Id. at 956. 
14
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 NEPA requires federal agencies to “include an environmental 
impact statement in every recommendation or report on proposals 
for… major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment…”106 Agencies whose procedures do not require 
preparation of an environmental impact statement must first prepare an 
environmental assessment.107 An environmental assessment briefly 
provides sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to 
prepare an environmental impact statement.108  
 FERC acknowledged the availability of the SCC but concluded 
that, “it would not be appropriate or informative to use for this 
project.”109 The agency provided three reasons: (1) the lack of 
consensus on the appropriate discount rate leads to significant 
variation in output, (2) the tool does not measure the actual 
incremental impacts of a project on the environment, and (3) there are 
no established criteria identifying the monetized values that are to be 
considered significant for NEPA purposes.110 Petitioners disagreed 
with FERC’s assessment, but the court dismissed their argument 
stating that the petitioners failed to identify another method other than 
using the SCC that FERC could have used to determine how the 
“project’s incremental contribution to [greenhouse gas emissions] 
would result in physical effects on the environment, either locally or 
globally.”111 The court determined that the petitioners failed to provide 
a reason to doubt the reasonableness of FERC’s conclusion that 
applying the SCC was not appropriate.112  
 
                                                 
106 Id. at 953. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 956. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
15
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ZERO ZONE, INC. V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
 
 In Zero Zone, Petitioners challenged the substance of the rules set 
forth by the DOE regarding CREs and the decision-making process.113  
Zero Zone, Inc. is a small business that specializes in CREs.114 The 
Air-Conditioning, Heating and Refrigeration Institute is a trade 
association of CRE manufacturers. Both parties petitioned for review 
of the New Standards and the 2014 Test Procedure Rule (“Test 
Procedure”).115 The motion was granted by the Seventh Circuit for 
review.116 The Seventh Circuit determined that the DOE acted in a 
manner that was worthy of court deference.117 The New Standards 
Rule was premised on analytical models that were considered to have 
substantial evidence in support of it.118 As a result, the New Standards 
Rule was not arbitrary nor capricious.119 This section reviews the facts 
of Zero Zone and the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning for their holding.  
 
A. The New Standards Rule 
 
 In 2010, the DOE began the process of revising CRE energy 
efficiency standards. The agency published a sixty-page framework 
and a notice regarding the proposal of new CRE energy efficiency 
                                                 
113 Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2016). 
The EPCA grants the Seventh Circuit jurisdiction to hear the case. Zero Zone was 
petitioned directly to the Seventh Circuit. 42 U.S.C.A. 6311(9)(A) (West, Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 114-224) (“Any person who will be adversely affected by a rule 
prescribed under section 6293, 6294, or 6295 of this title may, at any time within 60 
days after the date on which such rule is prescribed, file a petition with the United 
States court of appeals for the circuit in which such person resides or has his 
principal place of business, for judicial review of such rule.”). 
114 Zero Zone, Inc., 832 F.3d at 661. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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standards.120 Additionally, the DOE published a technical support 
document for the proposed rule, and also held a public meeting to 
solicit feedback and provide preliminary responses regarding the 
proposed rules.121  
 The proposal listed new standards for forty-nine classes of CRE. 
The classes were defined by a combination of the equipment’s 
geometry, door type, condensing-unit configuration, and operating 
temperature.122 The proposed rule established the maximum daily 
energy consumption for each class of CRE which would be 
determined by either the unit’s refrigerated volume or by the unit’s 
total display area (TDA).123 The DOE set forth higher standards for 
energy consumption that applied to forty-one equipment classes which 
they determined were both technologically feasible and economically 
justified.124  
 The DOE determined the appropriate standard for each class by 
using a design-option engineering analysis.125 Here, the DOE chose to 
use a representative unit from each class of CRE.126 Then, the DOE 
calculated how much it would cost manufacturers to implement more 
efficient components into their CRE units.127 The DOE also calculated 
the daily energy consumption that would result from manufactures 
implementing the more efficient components.128 The DOE used these 
calculations to determine what would be a feasible maximum energy 
                                                 
120 Id. at 667. The notice of proposed rulemaking for the New Standards Rule 
was issued on September 11, 2013. Id. at 667 n. 9. 
121 Id. at 667. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. The DOE did not make any changes regarding eight equipment classes 
and the standards for aforementioned classes remained consistent with the 2009 
Final Rule. Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. The DOE chose a unit that was toward the larger end of that class. Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
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consumption level for a unit of that size.129 The calculation served as a 
launching point for the DOE, which it used to establish an equation to 
determine a CRE unit’s maximum energy consumption level.130 This 
standard was meant to be used in the 2009 Final Rule; however, the 
DOE received negative feedback regarding the effect their equation 
would have on smaller units.131 Thus, the DOE decided to allow 
manufacturers to use any design path that was most convenient for 
them.132 
 The DOE, in order to satisfy statutory requirements, considered 
whether the New Standards were economically justified.133 To do so, 
the agency created five potential trial standard levels of energy 
efficiency that would be required by each class.134 It then conducted a 
cost-benefit analysis for each level, and concluded that the third-
highest level would offer the maximum improvement in efficiency that 
is technologically feasible and economically justified while still 
resulting in significant energy conservation.135 Per requirement, the 
DOE requested a letter from the United States Department of Justice 
wherein the department determined the New Standards would not have 
an anticompetitive effect.136  
 The DOE officially put the New Standards into effect after it 
concluded that the benefits outweighed the costs per the statutorily 
imposed economic justification requirement.137 
                                                 
129 Id. The DOE ranked the components in order of cost and drew a cost-
efficiency curve to determine what would be feasible. Id. 
130 Id. at 665. 
131 Id. The DOE considered the comments and established an “offset” factor 
for each class. This allowed smaller equipment to consume more energy. Id. 
132 Id. This allowed manufacturers to retain features they found valuable while 
still manufacturing equipment that fell within the New Standard. Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136
 Id. at 666. 
137 Id. (Development of new CRE would cost manufacturers between $93.9 
and $165 million. The benefit to consumers would be between $4.93 and $11.74 
billion). 
18
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 9
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/9
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
254 
B. The 2014 Test Procedure Rule 
 
 The New Standards requires a test procedure to be used in 
conjunction with the standards.138 The Test Procedure includes a 
method on how to calculate the TDA of CRE.139 The equation requires 
certain measurements of the unit to be entered into a general 
equation.140 One measurement is the “Length of Commercial 
Refrigerated Display Merchandiser” (LCR). The DOE’s New 
Standards make the LCR directly proportional to a CRE unit’s 
maximum energy consumption level.141   
 The DOE published the proposed method to solicit comments.142 
The LCR included the total length of the transparent area on CRE, but 
it did not include any opaque or non-transparent areas.143 This irked 
several manufacturers who submitted comments opposing the 
definition of the LCR arguing that it went against the common 
industry standard.144 The DOE took these comments into account and 
revised their testing procedure rule to include the industry standard.145  
 
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding 
 
 The Seventh Circuit considered the challenges to: (1) the DOE’s 
engineering analysis; (2) the DOE’s economic analysis; (3) the DOE’s 
regulatory flexibility analysis regarding the effect the New Standards 
may have on small businesses; (4) the DOE’s assessment of the 
cumulative regulatory burden; and (5) the 2014 Test Procedure Rule. 
                                                 
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
140 Id. 
141 Id. The longer the display on a CRE unit, the more energy a CRE unit is 
allowed to consume on a daily basis. Id. 
142 Id.  
143 Id. 
144
 Id. The common industry standard measured the LCR by measuring the 
CRE unit’s inside wall to inside wall, which would “disregard the presence of non-
transparent mullions and door frames. Id. 
145 Id. 
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1. Engineering Analysis 
 
 The Petitioners challenged the DOE’s engineering analysis 
arguing that the DOE did not provide an opportunity for comments 
regarding the DOE’s engineering spreadsheet.146 The Seventh Circuit 
rejected this argument because the DOE did provide two technical 
support documents that presented all of the necessary data regarding 
the New Standards.147 The court held that the data not being organized 
into a spreadsheet was irrelevant because all of the underlying data 
contained in the spreadsheet was present in the technical support 
documents.148 
 Petitioners also challenged the technologically feasible energy 
consumption level for each class.149 The challenge addressed the 
DOE’s modeling of compressors.150The DOE concluded that a high 
efficiency single speed hermetic compressor would be ten percent 
more efficient than the standard level compressor.151 This was 
challenged by several manufacturers who were able to persuade the 
DOE that the figure was inaccurate.152 The DOE then applied an 
estimate presented by a single manufacturer and settled on the 
efficiency being two percent.153 Petitioners argued this figure was too 
inaccurate to rely on the estimate by a single manufacturer.154 
However, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the Petitioners contention 
stating that the chosen figure is supported by substantial evidence and 
was reached through a reasoned decision making process.155 Further, 
the Seventh Circuit stated they have a limited role because courts only 
                                                 
146 Id. at 670. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 671. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 672. 
154 Id. 
155 Id.  
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require that an agency acknowledge factual uncertainties and identify 
the considerations it found persuasive in making its decision.156  
 Another challenge by Petitioners focused on the insulation foam 
thickness. Petitioners questioned the validity of the New Standards by 
arguing that the DOE acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it 
modeled the insulation component.157 The Petitioners pointed out that 
the recommended increase in insulation foam thickness would not be 
possible for certain refrigerators and freezers because of limited floor 
space.158 The Seventh Circuit once again dismissed Petitioner’s 
contention stating that the DOE provides manufacturers with the 
choice to use alternative methods if redesigning the insulation is not an 
available design option.159 The Seventh Circuit held that this cannot be 
arbitrary or capricious because it was based on substantial evidence.160   
 
2. Economic Analysis 
  
 The EPCA requires that efficiency standards be economically 
justified.161 Petitioners argued that the economic standards were 
unjustified.162 First, the Petitioners argued that the DOE acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously when it assumed that the new CRE  
standards would not result in “significant changes” in purchasing 
behavior.163 The DOE treated CRE to be price inelastic.164 The DOE 
admitted to having inadequate information regarding CRE customer 
behavior.165 The DOE therefore made a prediction about the CRE 
                                                 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 673.  
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 673–74.  
160 Id. at 674.  
161 42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-224).  
162 Id. 
163
 Zero Zone, Inc., 832 F.3d at 675. 
164 Id. Price inelasticity is when an increase in price does not impact the 
amount being purchased. Id. 
165 Id. 
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market, which the Seventh Circuit held was not arbitrary or 
capricious.166 The DOE’s prediction regarding market elasticity was 
that businesses would continue to purchase CRE regardless of the 
price because it would be necessary for them to comply with health 
code regulations.167  Businesses must store their food at proper 
temperatures to comply with health code regulations, which is an 
example as to why the purchase of CRE would continue.168 The 
DOE’s argument is helped by the fact that there is a lack of 
alternatives to CRE. 
 Second, Petitioners challenged the use of SCC in the DOE’s 
environmental benefits analysis. The Petitioners argue that the EPCA 
does not allow for the consideration of environmental factors.169 
Additionally, the Petitioners claimed the DOE’s analysis of the SCC 
was arbitrary and capricious.170 The Seventh Circuit determined that 
Congress did intend for the DOE to have the ability to consider the 
reduction in SCC.171 The Seventh Circuit reasoned it was reasonable 
to conclude that the EPCA “requires the DOE to consider the need for 
national energy…conservation”; the Court went on to say that it is 
appropriate to measure the expected reduction in environmental costs 
in a cost-benefit analysis.172 The Petitioners also challenge the use of 
the SCC arguing that: “(1) who exactly worked on the SCC analysis 
had not been made public; (2) the inputs to the models were not peer 
reviewed; and (3) the damages functions, or variables based on 
problems like sea level rise, were determined in an arbitrary 
manner.”173 The DOE admitted that the SCC has limitations.174 The 
DOE cited to multiple parties that referenced the SCC values such as a 
                                                 
166 Id. at 676.  
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 677. 
171 Id.  
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 678. 
174 Id. 
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2010 interagency group report and the Office of Management and 
Budget’s Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review.175 
 Petitioners argued that the DOE erroneously considered the global 
benefits to the environment while only considering the national 
costs.176 The EPCA only concerns national energy and water 
conservation.177 The DOE responded by noting that climate change 
policies effect the entire world.178 The Petitioners argument regarding 
the lack of consideration for global costs fell short because they do not 
provide any estimation or example of global costs.179 
 Lastly, Petitioners challenged the anticompetitive effects the New 
Standards would have. Petitioners argue that the DOJ’s letter was not 
adequate in its reasoning, and that the submission and publication of 
the DOJ letter were untimely.180 The Seventh Circuit dismissed both 
arguments. First, the Seventh Circuit held that the EPCA places the 
burden on the DOJ to provide adequate reasoning, not the DOE 
regarding anti-competitive measures.181  
 
THE SCC SHOULD BE USED IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY 
REGULATORY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES 
 
 The Seventh Circuit denied the Petitioners’ challenge to the 
DOE’s New Standards and Test Procedure. More importantly, the 
Seventh Circuit upheld the use of the SCC, holding that the use of the 
SCC in a cost-benefit analysis is not arbitrary or capricious. This 
section will present the drawbacks of the SCC. Also, it will discuss 
                                                 
175 Id. 
176 Id.  
177 42 U.S.C.A. § 6295(o)(2)(B)(i)(VI) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
114-244). 
178 Zero Zone, Inc., 832 F.3d at 679. 
179
 Id. 
180 Id. at 680. 
181 Id. at 681–82. The DOE has a “secondary role under the [anti-competitive] 
provision of the EPCA.” Id. 
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why the Seventh Circuit was correct in its holding that the SCC is not 
arbitrary or capricious. 
 
A. The SCC is Not Perfect 
 
The SCC is a useful tool for agencies when creating 
regulations.182 It allows the agency to factor in CO2 costs, which 
previously agencies were unable to do. However, the SCC is not 
perfect. 
The SCC has been referred to as a “black box” by one member of 
Congress.183 The concern regarding the use of the SCC is that it will 
continue to be used in a variety of economically significant rules 
despite the fact that the settled upon figure is highly controversial 
among experts.184 Also, the amount of benefit the SCC may add to a 
CBA makes it difficult for opponents of a regulation to rebuke the 
CBA. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency quantified 
that potential regulations, regarding tailpipe emissions, would result in 
a $280 billion benefit while being outweighed by a $350 billion 
cost.185 The regulation would have failed, but for the addition of the 
SCC into the cost-benefit analysis which caused the proposed 
regulation to result in a net benefit of $100 billion and making the 
benefit a total of $380 billion.186  
The SCC gives agencies a tool that can extrapolate the benefit, 
thereby allowing regulations in danger of failing a cost-benefit 
analysis to survive scrutiny. The SCC benefit may vary in different 
situations, but the SCC can account for over half of the benefit of a 
regulation. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency 
published emission guidelines regarding new and existing power 
                                                 
182 High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 
1174, 1190–91 (D. Colo. 2014). 
183 Jay G. Stirling, Note, How to Deal with Hornets: The Administrative 
Procedure Act and the Social Cost of Carbon, 100 IOWA L. REV. 854, 857 (2011).  
184 See Id. at 856. 
185 Johnston, supra note 2, at 36.  
186 Id. 
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plants; the SCC accounted for 40-65% of the projected benefits.187 The 
application of the SCC can therefore have a great impact on CBA and 
allow more environmentally friendly regulations to pass.   
The cost of carbon may be difficult to grasp due to its size, given 
the industrial-size dollar figures.188 However, the figure is much easier 
to comprehend when applied to the average American. For example, 
the activities of a single American produces roughly eighteen tons of 
CO2 per year.189 It is estimated that a third of that comes from 
transportation.190 If you multiply the 18 tons by the SCC, the amount 
comes to $222, which represents how much the daily commute costs 
in societal damages each year.191 This figure, however, may be much 
larger depending on your calculation of the SCC. For example, two 
Stanford researchers have estimated the SCC to cost $220 per ton.192 
Using this figure, the average daily commute damages come out to be 
somewhere around $1,320 each year.193 This illustrates the wide range 
of results that may occur depending on which calculation of the SCC 
is used. Additionally, it creates a problem for the government when 
trying to calculate the SCC. If the government adopted the Stanford 
figure it would make it nearly impossible for businesses to challenge 
regulations successfully.194 
Some experts argue that the SCC uses flawed, or inaccurate, 
estimates when being calculated. The SCC estimate is based on 
IAMs.195 The main issue with the IAM is that the modeler has freedom 
in choosing the forms, values and inputs that are used to calculate the 
                                                 
187 Stirling, supra note 157, at 856. 
188 Wihbey, supra note 1. 
189 Id.  
190 Id.  
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193
 Id. (This is about a $1,100 difference per year). 
194 See supra notes 159-160. The SCC adds to the benefit in a cost-benefit 
analysis which may result in the benefit surpassing the burden).  
195 2010 Support Document, supra note 33, at 3. 
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SCC.196 The model uses six different elements.197 Interestingly the 
application of this model resulted in two significantly outcomes. Two 
different publications, Nordhaus (2008) and Stern (2007), applied 
assumptions regarding discount rates, abatement costs, parameters 
affecting temperature change, and the function determining economic 
impact to determine what the SCC should be.198 Nordhaus concluded 
that the SCC should be around or less than $20 a ton while Stern 
concluded the SCC should be above $200 a ton.199 This glaring 
difference is a result of the assumptions that each person applied.200 
This demonstrates the consistency issue that is present in the SCC. The 
model depends on assumptions, which is what models do, but the 
assumptions vary so significantly that one model of the estimated cost 
of the SCC can be ten times larger than another model.201  
 Environmental and energy regulations attempt to reduce 
environmental harm by imposing stricter standards on businesses. 
Agencies who implement these regulations hope to provide a benefit 
to the public. However, these regulations force businesses to adapt to 
be in compliance. Compliance costs placed upon manufacturers 
because of the SCC will likely be transferred onto customers. For 
instance, the Obama administration estimates that a socially efficient 
carbon price would be $36 per ton.202 This tax will translate to $0.36 
per gallon at the gasoline pump.203 This is a significant increase in gas 
prices that would affect all Americans.  
 
                                                 
196 Robert S. Pindyck, Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models Tell Us?, 
51 J. ECON. LITERATURE 860, 863 (2013). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id.  
200 Id. 
201 See id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
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B. The SCC is a Beneficial Tool to Use in a Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 The SCC may not be perfect, but it is a useful tool to use a cost-
benefit analysis. Agencies should have the ability to utilize the SCC, 
and if they decide not to, provide a basis as to why they believe the use 
of it would be inappropriate. Carbon pricing may be the simplest and 
most transparent way for the public sector to address global 
warming.204 
Despite concerns over the accuracy of the SCC, the IWG 
continues to study and improve the SCC. For example, in 2010 the 
IWG calculated the estimates of the SCC for 2020 CO2 emissions as 
being $7, $26, or $42 per ton emitted.205 However, in 2013 the IWG 
recalculated the 2020 CO2 emissions cost to $12, $42, or $62 per ton 
respectively.206 The SCC is still in its early stages and it will continue 
to improve and become more accurate as scientific and economic 
understanding improves. 
The arguments against the inaccuracy and weight of the SCC may 
have merit, but thus far have been inconsequential. Researchers have 
examined the impact the addition of SCC has on regulations when 
applied to a cost-benefit analysis.207 The results thus far have shown 
minimal impact.208 According to a 2014 paper published by the 
Brookings Institution, the SCC has been involved in 53 regulatory 
policies.209 The application of the SCC has resulted to be only 14 
percent of net benefits, on average, being accounted for reducing 
carbon.210 Further, the application of the SCC has tipped the scales of 
                                                 
204 Jess Gaspar & Bill Jarvis, The Fiduciary Case for Carbon Expsoure 
Management Now (Not Later), COMMONFUND INSIGHTS BLOG (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://www.commonfund.org/2016/10/18/post-carbon-exposure-management-now/. 
205 Johnston, supra note 2, at 36. 
206 Id. 
207 Wihbey, supra note 1. 
208
 Id. 
209 Robert W. Hahn & Robert A. Ritz, Does the Social Cost of Carbon Matter? 
Evidence from US Policy, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 235 (2015). 
210 Id. at 238. 
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a cost-benefit analysis in roughly only one out of every eight rule-
making scenarios.211  
Courts have started to face challenges to the SCC. The Ninth 
Circuit correctly articulated that agencies must factor in the SCC in 
cost-benefit analyses because failing to do so would mean the cost of 
CO2 emissions is $0.212 The cost of CO2 emissions is certainly not $0 
evidenced by the fact that there is wide acceptance of the fact that 
CO2 emissions harm our climate.213 Harmful effects to the global 
climate must be resulting in some sort of cost to the population. The 
SCC gives agencies and the government an opportunity to measure 
these harmful effects while also giving them an opportunity to correct 
the harmful effects.  
Without the SCC, agencies would not be able to quantify global 
environmental harms. The SCC is beneficial and useful as a tool 
because it mitigates CO2. For example, over the next forty years, three 
vehicle rulemakings are projected to result in a benefit ranging from 
$78 billion to $1.2 trillion.214 
 
C. Courts Should Defer to Agencies Regarding SCC Use 
 
 The use of the SCC is neither arbitrary nor capricious. Courts 
should use Chevron Doctrine when deciding cases regarding the use, 
or non-use, of the SCC. In Zero Zone, Petitioners argued that that the 
DOE acted arbitrarily and capriciously when enacting the New 
Standards Rule by including the SCC in its cost-benefit analysis. The 
Seventh Circuit correctly held that the DOE acted within its powers. 
                                                 
211 Id. at 244. 
212 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1200 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
213 Howard Shelanski & Maurice Obstfeld, Estimating the Benefits from 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions Reductions, THE WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/07/02/estimating-benefits-carbon-dioxide-
emissions-reductions. 
214 The Social Cost of Carbon, ENV. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon (last visited Dec. 1, 2016). 
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 The scope of review for the arbitrary and capricious standard is 
narrow.215 Courts should not substitute its judgment automatically so 
as to agree with the agency.216 Instead, the court must examine the 
relevant data and articulate as satisfactory explanation as to why the 
court believes there is a rational connection between the facts found 
and a choice made regarding the agency’s action.217  
 The arbitrary and capricious standard fails if the agency relies on 
factors which Congress has not intended for the agency to consider.218 
It may also fail if the agency has “entirely failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise.”219  
 Agencies that factor the SCC are trying to consider every 
important factor in a CBA. This, however, does not mean that agencies 
must apply the SCC.220 Agencies must consider the SCC to satisfy 
statutory requirements.221 Agencies are mandated by the APA to pass 
regulations which are not arbitrary or capricious.222 Furthermore, a 
regulation may be arbitrary or capricious if the agency fails to consider 
an important aspect of the problem, or if the agency fails to offer an 
explanation for its decision that is counter to the evidence before the 
agency.223 Greenhouse gas emissions result in detrimental effects on a 
global scale. Agencies which fail to consider such effects are not 
considering an important aspect of a global environmental problem. 
                                                 
215 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866–67 (1983). 
216 Id. 
217 Id.  
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 See High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 
3d 1174, 1193 (D. Colo. 2014). 
221 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-224). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
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Additionally, if an agency believes that the SCC would be an 
inappropriate factor in a cost-benefit analysis, the agency should 
provide a basis for its conclusion.224 The Chevron Doctrine allows 
courts to defer to executive agencies in situations where Congress has 
not directly spoken to an issue.225 Congress has yet to take action 
regarding the SCC, and therefore we must defer to agencies.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The Seventh Circuit was the first federal court to uphold the use 
of the SCC in a cost-benefit analysis. It is unlikely that this will be the 
last court to rule on such an issue. The SCC is a controversial concept 
because of the politics involved. Generally, political liberals hope to 
preserve the environment and strive to implement ways to reduce 
global pollution. Political conservatives generally strive to reduce the 
burdens placed upon businesses. The SCC is likely to allow 
regulations to survive scrutiny. However, the SCC is not a tool that 
will allow agencies to pass any regulation they want. Instead, it is a 
tool that will allow agencies to factor in negative global effects on the 
environment.  
 Executive agencies should continue to develop the SCC. With 
time, the SCC and the scientific and economic estimates behind it will 
start to gain wide acceptance and, more importantly, consistency. 
Experts should be striving to continue development of the SCC so the 
potential per ton costs are not so wide ranging. Development of the 
SCC is important to developing a functional regulatory framework as 
well as to preserving the environment. The uncertainty regarding the 
use of the SCC in a CBA should be resolved by Congressional action. 
 
                                                 
224 See High Country Conservation Advocates, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1193. 
225 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984). 
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